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This paper aims to identify the risks and real economic drivers of crises inherent in 
the monetary union over and above the current institutional challenges, seeking 
an answer to what fundamentally drives possible economic disturbances and what 
may impede the self-correction of markets. After analysing the available data, the 
author concludes that the euro area’s real economic homogeneity and market 
adjustment performance exhibit a mixed picture. The centre-periphery fault line 
may both give rise to and preserve imbalances. The author concludes that to prevent 
this and to reap the expected benefits of the euro, a comprehensive and targeted 
competitiveness, structural and regional policy framework is called for.
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1. Single currency areas: the risk of an imbalance spiral
The protracted crisis of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since 
2010 and its slow recovery lend special relevance to the study of single currency 
areas. When seeking explanations and analysing the long-term viability of the area, 
identifying possible systemic issues, in addition to assessing individual member state 
responsibility and current crisis management, seems inevitable. If such issues are 
not addressed, they may pose recurring challenges to even adequately specified 
crisis management mechanisms.
The euro area crisis is a very complex set of issues stemming from global economic 
and financial developments, economic thinking that defines the adoption of the 
euro, a lack of adequate preliminary development of institutional frameworks and 
their loose application. The time that has elapsed since the onset of the crisis is 
apparently insufficient to clearly outline the emerging direction. At the same time, 
however, the entire period of the use of the euro is too brief and noisy to firmly 
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identify or rule out the significance of specific factors. It is underpinned by the 
fact that the introduction of a single currency is in and of itself a diverse (one-off) 
event, so the background and degree of the indirectly triggered processes may at 
least partially diverge from the impacts that prevail during long-term functioning. 
This paper therefore aims to identify the risks and real economic drivers of crises 
inherent in the monetary union, over and above the current institutional challenges. 
Although the elements of the special set of criteria described below and used 
with respect to the EMU in Part 3 may be linked to various degrees to the specific 
characteristics of the 2010 euro crisis, over the longer term, they may even play 
a pivotal role in the degree to which the monetary block must “permanently adopt 
crisis management”.
As we know, the economies that make up the single currency area use a single 
currency in lieu of their own currency, which presumes uniform monetary policy. 
The key issue of this scheme is the constraint of zone-level assessment which 
creates an unsurmountable problem for the euro area’s central bank. As long as 
an economy has its own currency and monetary policy, it can use the currency 
exchange rate as a channel for (at least) short-term adjustment, while markets 
have less power to push the entity into a liquidity crisis and ultimately, insolvency 
(Csajbók – Csermely 2002; Krugman – Obstfeld 2003; De Grauwe 2012a; De Grauwe 
2013).1 By contrast, joining the monetary union means giving up the exchange rate 
tool and adopting a monetary policy tailored to the entire zone, which may render 
the generated (public) debt similar to foreign currency debt.
It can of course be assumed that small, open economies already have limited 
ability to take advantage of exchange rate adjustments and therefore giving up 
their own currency is not such a great sacrifice (Palánkai 2012). However, the risk 
of endogenous imbalance nuances this finding. It is not always possible to set an 
interest rate that is suited to the entire zone. Asymmetrical developments in certain 
regions of the area create a dilemma for the central bank: it either hikes the interest 
rate which curbs inflation in the region exhibiting an upswing and simultaneously 
deepens the recession in the other region, or does the opposite by attempting to 
prevent the risk of deflation in the latter while simultaneously further spurring 
inflation in the other regions by cutting the interest rate (Mundell 1961; McKinnon 
1963; Kenen 1969). Whichever path it chooses, a harmful feedback is created within 
the system, and members of the currency area are highly likely to become stuck in 
imbalance unless alternative adjustment mechanisms come into play.
Although the literature typically presents this monetary policy paradox through 
the example of exogenous changes such as asymmetrical external demand shocks, 
the issue may also arise as a result of endogenous processes. This case is first and 
1  Ultimately, we can always presume that the entity can assume liabilities by creating money through its 
central bank.
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foremost linked to the introduction of the single currency and is very similar to 
the findings made with regard to the euro crisis (Part 2). Hale – Obstfeld (2014) 
offer a model-like presentation of the fact that if the creation of a monetary block 
entails a decline in internal loan interest rates, it not only increases gross capital 
flows, but also increases the proportion of intra-area financing. According to the 
model, cheaper credit means that projects with lower potential for success are also 
launched. This in turn results in the concentration of credit risk within the currency 
area. This also creates contradictory requirements for the zone’s central bank (which 
also takes into account financial stability) if lending is markedly unidirectional. An 
initial interest rate decrease can be presumed in part due to transaction costs and in 
part due to the reduction of certain risks, but may obviously also stem from flawed 
risk perception and excessive market optimism. Due to the single key policy rate 
and financial market integration, the level of interest rates in member states cannot 
diverge significantly over a longer term (De Grauwe 2012a), so the problems of 
imbalance stemming from this must be faced later down the line. The likelihood of 
unilateral lending patterns increases in line with the area’s heterogeneity.2 In such 
a scenario, addressing asymmetries is more difficult not only from a monetary, but 
also from a political perspective, as due to the internal inter-linkages, part of the 
zone’s debt problems can only be resolved to the detriment and at the expense of 
the lending members (Baldwin et al. 2015).
The above facts confirm that, first and foremost, imbalances should be approached 
from a gross perspective. This is a novel stance insofar as – prior to the onset of the 
global financial crisis, during the period referred to as the “great moderation” – the 
severity of the financial stability consequences stemming from gross capital flows 
was not recognised (Bracke et al. 2010; Borio – Disyatat 2011; MNB 2011; MNB 
2014). Gross flows and stocks deserve special attention because the assets of others 
are not available for the repayment of the debt of certain economic agents and 
sectors, even if the whole economy otherwise has extensive net external claims. The 
net external position, with the exception of valuation changes, varies in function of 
the joint balance of the current account and the capital account. The net financing 
deficit/surplus for the period is equal to the financial account of the balance of 
payments, which is, however, derived from financial transactions, the gross value 
of which is greater than their net balance. In the era of global financial markets, the 
difference between gross and net numbers takes on several orders of magnitude, 
and financing patterns are typically complex and feature variable risk profiles. At 
the same time, some arguments support the fact that the current account balance 
remains a relevant economic policy variable (Obstfeld 2012a). Financing positions 
that remain unidirectional for sustained periods are often symptoms of tensions 
accumulating within the economy. In the longer term, the economy’s role as 
2  The Hale–Obstfeld model already pertains to the centre-periphery relationship within the area.
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borrower or lender determines the primary pressure on economic agents and the 
banking system. Unidirectional net patterns may signal unsustainable processes for 
the market, which is linked to the sudden stop of liquidity. (In a basic scenario, the 
[sovereign] members of currency areas are particularly sensitive to such situations.3) 
Thus, even if the great crisis of the past period and its ramifications did not present 
as a traditional current account crisis (MNB 2014), the growing unilateral swings of 
current accounts were indicative of the underlying imbalances.
These swings can be linked to the endogenous disturbances of currency areas in 
the following manner: In the case of asymmetrical developments, the entity in 
the positive branch will acquire a current account surplus in the wake of growing 
demand for its exports. It will also have the opportunity to lend to the economies 
buying its products (see De Grauwe – Ji 2012; De Grauwe 2013). Growing imports 
and decreasing exports give rise to the need for external borrowing (current account 
deficit) in the latter economies. Meanwhile, we arrive at the dilemma of a single 
monetary policy: inflation must be curbed in the first type of entity while deflation 
must be curbed in the second type, sooner or later.4 Let’s assume that the central 
bank, focusing on the latter, cuts the interest rate. It is clear that in such a scenario, 
it is worthwhile for the second entity to borrow even more and to purchase even 
more from the former entity. Even if the local downturn/slump resolves, the current 
account deficit continues to swell simultaneously with the other entity’s current 
account surplus. Here too, the accumulating debt is greater in gross terms and 
exhibits a more complex pattern, but the dynamics of the current account balance 
shed light on the imbalance disturbance in the case of this specific endogenous 
problem. A similar process can be described if the root of the asymmetry is a sudden 
decline in the price of financing, which means lower interest rates than before for 
a part of this area (see Hale – Obstfeld 2014).
The primary channels for preventing the endogenous spiral could be labour mobility 
and/or flexible price and wage adjustment. Labour mobility enables the area in 
the positive branch to absorb the labour of economies experiencing a downturn 
in the event of an asymmetric development. This decreases unemployment in 
the latter entity while mitigating (wage) inflationary pressure in the former entity. 
Price and wage adjustment theoretically impacts competitiveness according to 
a logic similar to the devaluation and appreciation of the exchange rate. If prices 
and wages fall in a currency area member in recession, exports and capital flows 
may increase and the economic downturn may resolve. In parallel, in the entities 
experiencing an upswing, rising prices and wages hurt competitiveness while rising 
import demand fosters successful internal devaluation (price and wage cuts) in 
3  Later in this paper, we address the practical differences that stem from currency area “simply” encompassing 
regions or sovereign states.
4  The price level of domestic products decreases due to the slump in demand.
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the former economies. Unilateral current account dynamics are adjusted. An 
important observation is that competitiveness is not only made up of price-type 
factors. Whatever the case may be, the described mechanism certainly points to the 
necessity for one element, namely the importance of increasing the consumption 
(expenditure) of the economy experiencing an upswing during times of adjustment.
The brief presentation of alternative mechanisms also shows that this is a slower 
process that faces more obstacles compared to bespoke monetary policy and 
exchange rate-led adjustment. As a result, the sacrifices of joining the currency 
area cannot be ruled out. In other words: it is not a given that any economic 
grouping can operate a currency union. Although we have not stated it explicitly 
so far, it is apparent that certain benefits hoped for may create significant leeway 
for monetary unification efforts. For entities closely linked by trade and other areas, 
lower transaction costs, the avoidance or mitigation of exchange rate and other 
risks, improved price comparability and the resulting pick-up in trade and potentially 
even greater economic significance for the currency promise huge benefits.
Taken together, the substantial benefits and risks warrant the existence of guidance 
for investigating the viability of currency areas of differing composition.
The literature known as the theory of optimum currency areas (OCA) attempts 
to provide such points of reference. A currency area is optimal if it enables the 
dilemma of monetary policy to be averted. The conditions for an optimum currency 
area can be summed up as follows (Table 15).
The most perfect functioning of the above alternative adjustment mechanisms 
is necessary: labour and capital mobility (1–2) and price and wage flexibility 
(3). With regard to the latter, it should be added that cutting prices and wages 
may encounter resistance and secondly, its impact is not always clear as it may 
exacerbate the burdens of deleveraging in the presence of indebtedness. Otherwise, 
it is characteristically slow, in which a coordination issue also plays a role (Krugman 
2011).
5  See also Benczes 2014; Szijártó 2014.
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Table 1
Optimality criteria and their economic reasons according to the OCA theory
Criterion Link to optimality
1. Labour mobility Supports the correction of imbalances  
Obstacles: labour force heterogeneity, language and cultural 
background
2. Capital mobility, integrated 
financial markets
Supports the correction of imbalances and risk-sharing and 
synchronicity within the zone
3. Price and wage flexibility Supports the correction of imbalances; Adjustment via internal 
devaluation is not without its own issues even if there is sufficient 
flexibility
4. Product market openness, 
level of integration
Multiplying benefits from using a single currency and (where 
applicable) more limited sacrifices from losing the country’s own 
currency exchange rate
5. Diversified economies No member should be substantially exposed to large-scale unilateral 
(partial) economic shocks
6. Similarity of economic 
structures
Similar industrial structure, sectoral proportions, similar technologies 
and work organisation within sectors, etc. creates greater symmetry
7. Synchronous business cycles, 
similar inflationary 
preferences and growth
Maintenance of symmetry
8. Similarity of institutional law, 
culture and language
Supports the maintenance of symmetrical situations and the 
effectiveness of the necessary adjustments as a general framework
Source: Edited based on the pioneering work on the OCA theory (Mundell 1961, McKinnon 1963, Kenen 
1969) and Krugman 2011 and De Grauwe 2012a.
As discussed earlier, the sacrifice of losing the currency exchange rate is mitigated 
by the large degree of economic openness of members towards each other (4). This 
also multiplies the benefits stemming from the use of the single currency. With the 
requirement of diversified economies (5) the inclusion of excessively specialised 
members, who are thus unilaterally exposed to partial economic shocks, can be 
avoided. The similarity of economic structures (6) ensures that turbulences shift 
the economies in a similar direction. The synchronisation need also appears in 
the requirement pertaining to the matching of business cycles, the similarity of 
inflationary preferences and growth rates (7). The deviation of the latter factors 
results in certain entities being forced to accept outcomes other than their 
preferences for a sustained period. Finally, legal and institutional similarity, cultural 
and linguistic proximity (8) – as a supplement to the traditional OCA conditions – can 
be mentioned as a general framework condition of symmetry (8).
The theory of optimum currency areas fundamentally follows the cost-benefit 
principle when defining the composition of monetary blocks. Based on this feature, 
it can be linked to the metallist monetary theory which derives the value of money 
from the pursuit of efficiency by the private economy. In a broader sense, the OCA 
was created within the framework of the new classical economic mainstream, 
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anchoring the primacy of market adjustment and monetary policy. Accordingly, it does 
not display the aspects that relate to the harmonisation of the scope of monetary 
and fiscal policies (Goodhart 1998; Barba – De Vivo 2013; Cesaratto 2015). Thus, 
it ignores the so-called cartelist approach (MNB 2011; Ábel et al. 2016), based 
on which a certain state involvement is necessary for the stability of money, or in 
a wording more tailored to our topic: some type of fiscal adjustment and coordination 
mechanism is needed. The existence or the lack of indications related to the uniform 
fiscal frameworks is relevant because it leads to differences in whether the members 
of the currency area can be regarded as “simple” regions or as countries. Markets 
perceive and treat the federal states of the USA differently than the member states of 
the euro area (Giavazzi – Spaventa 2010), which is attributable to a large extent to the 
degree of fiscal sovereignty of EU Member States. If we strictly follow the OCA criteria 
for defining the composition of a monetary block, we shall not incorporate fiscal 
coordination mechanisms or unify certain budgetary funds among the participants.6 
In this sense, the framework can be considered deficient. But this deficiency does not 
make it unfit for the purposes of the study, that is, the analysis of the possibility of 
system-level tensions. Fiscal and other institutional mechanisms within the discourse 
related to currency areas primarily appear with a crisis management, crisis prevention 
and early warning function. Creating these functions may prove to be of fundamental 
importance (Part 2), but it fails to trace back all of the driving forces of imbalances 
and is unable to eliminate them.
In the following, this article reviews the background of the establishment of the 
EMU and the weaknesses revealed during the crisis (Part 2). Thereafter, it examines 
the performance in the euro area in terms of alternative adjustment mechanisms 
and the other homogeneity criteria of the OCA, with special regard to the period 
following 2010 (Part 3).
2. The euro as a single currency
Western European integration efforts had already yielded significant results by the 
1960s, such as total customs union, common agricultural policy, the uniformisation 
of product regulations and the free movement of persons. Members also 
cooperated in the coordination of monetary and exchange rate policies. Expanding 
relationships naturally presented the opportunity for the single currency, and in 
a timely manner, due to the demise of the Bretton Woods system and the increasing 
volatility of national currencies (Delors Report 1989; Ingram 1973; Krugman 2011). 
The attainable benefits seemed significant based on the estimates regarding the 
reduction of transactional costs, the elimination of exchange rate risk and the 
expansion of trade (Frankel – Rose 1998, 2002). Finally, the general introduction 
6  It is not certain that we shall not deal with fiscal issues at all, but these may primarily arise as the source 
of entity specific shocks (see Part 2).
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of the euro as a single currency took place in 2002. Today, the euro is the official 
means of payment of 19 EU Member States.
The crisis makes the evaluation of the euro’s past fifteen years rather difficult if we 
accept the probable statement that the crisis is the result of systemic issues and 
harmful internal mechanisms. Some significant stability and macroeconomic risks 
associated with the currency union have materialised and represent substantial 
uncertainty for the future. Meanwhile, in terms of the attainable “traditional” 
benefits – reduction of transactional costs, etc. – the area may have obtained 
substantial profits, although the results and conclusions regarding the scale, the 
distribution and further prospects of such profits show great differences (Santos 
Silva – Tenreyro 2010; De Sousa 2011; Mongelli 2013; Petersen et al. 2013). As to 
how significant the convergence is among the economies and what direction it 
points to, the evidence is rather contradictory (see Neményi – Oblath 2012; Magas 
2016). Part 3 addresses this issue.
When preparing for the single European currency, numerous authors used the OCA 
theory as an evaluation framework. Already during this period, results showed that 
the block of countries wanting to introduce the euro failed to meet the optimum 
currency area criteria in several respects. According to the summary of Pisani-
Ferry (2012), asymmetries between member candidates, weak market adjustment 
mechanisms and the destabilisation risk of uniform monetary policy entailed by 
these factors appeared as an identified threat, which was difficult to estimate in 
advance. Although, as we know, it does not follow from the OCA theory, it is to 
be noted that already at the time of preparing for the currency union, there were 
some who drew attention to the significance of fiscal adjustment and coordination 
mechanisms (Godley 1992; Feldstein 1992).
At the same time, the edge of every identified problem was blunted by the frequent 
argumentation that the euro may endogenously transform the area into an OCA, 
because it accelerates economic integration, convergence and synchronization 
(OMOM Report 1990; Bayoumi – Eichengreen 1997; Frankel–Rose 1998; Pisani-
Ferry 2012; Estrada et al. 2013). If a monetary union is an optimum currency area 
(OCA), in principle, it is able to avert endogenous disturbances. However, the 2010 
crisis showed that “the process of perfection” of the expected speed certainly did 
not take place, and in a suboptimal scheme, broader economic policy coordination, 
a fiscal adjustment mechanism ensuring the stability of the single currency, and 
even coordinated macro-prudential policy are certainly needed.7 When the euro was 
7  It was only after the 2008 global crises that the relevance of this issue was more broadly recognised following 
the much higher capital flows, asset bubbles and financial imbalances (APFI). The need for macro-prudential 
policy is hence first warranted by general, global reasons rather than causes related to the currency area. It 
is another question that, as we have seen, in heterogeneous monetary blocks which are weak in alternative 
adjustment, the APFIs are given special endogenous incentives as well. Hence, all other things being equal, 
the higher the need for macro-prudential regulation, the less optimal the area.
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introduced, these aspects did not take hold, or they were applied with a different 
emphasis. Certain structural and regional funds were appropriated to mitigate 
economic differences between members (Delors Report 1989), but the magnitude 
of these funds was not substantial in the light of the wide-ranging fiscal powers 
and economic policy decision-making held by the Member States. The level of 
freedom of economic governance of the various Member States was accounted 
for as the source of entity-specific shocks. To handle the issue, fiscal sustainability 
rules were recommended first of all (Delors Report 1989; MNB 2011). The “no 
bail-out” declaration emphasised the rules, and at the same time, expressed the 
limitation of the risk community (Kiss J. 2011). While markets did not take this 
declaration seriously for a long time, when the crisis erupted, the uncertainty arising 
from it proved to be rather harmful. In a broader sense, this is related to the fact 
that when creating the EMU, neither crisis management procedures, nor any crisis 
management fund were institutionalised. The reason for this is that – in addition 
to the prospect of moral hazard – the great majority of systemic risks, and as such, 
the prospect for the private sector to become excessively indebted were not among 
the threats considered (Neményi – Oblath 2012; MNB 2011). The role of lender 
of last resort of the European Central Bank was also not clearly stipulated in the 
narrower monetary policy system (De Grauwe 2012b, 2013; Baldwin et al. 2015).8 
Therefore, the EMU was created as an interim scheme in which members became 
regions from a monetary perspective, but otherwise remained sovereign states.
It follows from the foregoing that the common crisis explanations which associate 
the issues with the responsibility of the indebted economies are only partially valid. 
Non-compliance with the rules, overheated lending and protracted recovery as 
symptoms are the effects of the institutional background’s weaknesses on the one 
hand and the endogenous disturbances presented in Part 1 on the other hand. Until 
2010, economies on the periphery, i.e., Portugal, Spain, Greece, Italy and Ireland 
built up various forms of debt problems with practically the same background. 
In Greece and partially in Portugal, this was primarily manifested as government 
debt, but in Spain and Ireland, the indebtedness of the private sector (households, 
construction industry and banking sector) surged to an extremely high level, 
accompanied by asset price bubbles (as shown by Neményi – Oblath 2012). (These 
economies got into trouble despite the fact that their governments complied with 
the Maastricht criteria regarding public deficit and indebtedness for a long time.)
The lending boom after 2002 was made possible by the cheap loans flowing in from 
the centre of the zone, which were dominantly mediated by the banking sector by 
8  This can be clarified in that the central banks of the Member States still had certain leeway in defining and 
evaluating eligible collateral for central bank loans (Ruparel – Persson 2011). Thus, they can also classify 
among eligible collateral the government papers of the Member State. By doing so, commercial banks are 
incentivised to purchase these papers, which, in turn, may alleviate the Member State’s financing difficulties. 
It is another question that all of this increases bank-state exposure, by increasing systemic risk.
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establishing complex bank-bank/bank-state interlacements. The single currency 
considerably deepened the integration of financial markets, both the magnitude and 
the ratio of gross capital flows among Member States surged, as the phenomenon 
of home bias decreased, and portfolio diversification in the euro area picked up 
momentum (De Grauwe 2012a; Pagano – von Tadden 2004). Money flows were 
driven by the level of interest rates fast becoming uniform, which meant low or even 
negative real interest rates for the countries in the periphery, which had previously 
only had access to more expensive financing. The reduction of transaction costs 
and the disappearance of exchange rate risks obviously played a role in that, but 
also some kind of erroneous risk perception which levelled the yield of periphery 
government bonds with that of German government securities.9 The debtor-creditor 
9  The time series of yields on 10-year government bonds of EU Member States can be found in: “Long-term 
Interest Rate Statistics for EU Member States”, European Central Bank. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/
money/long/html/index.en.html. Downloaded: 12 April 2016 
Figure 1
Share of foreign banks within consolidated bank receivables from Greek residents
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relationship illustrated in Figure 1 reflects the conclusions of Hale – Obstfeld (2014), 
according to which lending within the currency area shifts towards internal relations.
In Figure 1, we can clearly see the realignment of the structure of receivables of 
foreign banks from Greek residents: a decreasing share of creditors from outside 
the area between 1998 and 2008, and in parallel with this, an increased share of 
the volume of receivables of banks within the zone.
The mostly unilateral flow of credits primarily financed consumption and asset 
price bubbles on the periphery and not productivity and efficiency increasing 
investments. The boom in consumption primarily affected imported products 
and non-tradable goods (i.e. services). Thus, the utilisation of loans did not create 
the ability to repay external debt because it did not contribute to boosting future 
exports (Giavazzi – Spaventa 2010). During the initial years, it may have seemed 
that indebtedness is a natural consequence of economic convergence (Blanchard 
– Giavazzi 2002), but growth expectations proved to be exaggerated in view of the 
reasons mentioned in the foregoing.
In terms of the magnitude, the links among the players, the speculation related 
to the real estate bubbles and the not so prudent lending, capital flows can be 
approached from the perspective of the financial account, but the development 
of the crisis can also be clearly followed in the current account patterns. While the 
current accounts of the entire EMU remained in equilibrium vis-à-vis the global 
economy during the period under review, intra-euro area financing positions 
exhibited the proportions experienced between the USA and China (Schmitz – von 
Hagen 2011). Swings observable in Figure 2 represent the clearly unidirectional 
flows until 2008.10 The single monetary policy was unable to prevent imbalances, 
what is more, it further aggravated them because excessive lending on the 
periphery, and just as importantly, inflation exceeding the euro area average, would 
have required a higher interest rate, which did not seem justified for the other 
regions of the zone.
In 2010, the sudden outbreak of the crisis was essentially related to the fact that 
the market considered outstanding debt to be unsustainable. This cast a shadow 
on every economy of the euro area due to the interconnections among the 
banks and the states of the area, creating some kind of symmetrical situation for 
monetary policy (interest rate cut) during the next period. At the same time, the 
revelation of the risks entailed the widening of credit default swap premia. The 
direct stakeholders in this issue, i.e. the periphery states became isolated from 
10  Pasimeni (2016) also has an illustrative Figure which shows the developments in Germany’s current-account 
balance vis-à-vis the euro area. It also shows similarly robust current account surpluses, explicitly indicating 
that the surpluses and shortages shown in Figure 2 “are matching”.
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financial markets (Darvas 2013; De Grauwe 2013).11 The fragmentation of the 
financial market, the scaling down of internal market debtor-creditor relationships, 
and the stronger home bias can still be observed (Acharya et al. 2014). We can also 
see this in Figure 1. Despite the fact that we linked the crisis directly to excessive 
internal capital flows, fragmentation is also an issue. Because one of the channels 
of alternative adjustment is the mobility of capital, the low level of willingness to 
invest by non-residents compared to the past may also be the underlying reason 
for the protracted recovery in the area.12 In addition to this, we must also analyse 
the other mechanisms of market adjustment: the question is to what extent they 
played a role, in that the imbalances within the current accounts have declined in 
number by now.
11  This acute problem was finally resolved by the announcement of ECB’s OMT program in the fall of 2012 
as part of which the European Central Bank committed to the theoretically unlimited purchase of debt 
securities of the states in difficulty (Pisani-Ferry 2012; De Grauwe 2013).
12  The euro crisis highlights that the capital mobility/financial market integration criteria of the OCA must 
mostly signify the flexibility of working capital (foreign direct investments).
Figure 2
Developments in the current account balance of various euro area members as 
a percentage of GDP, 2002–2016
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3. Market adjustment mechanisms and real heterogeneity in the euro 
area
Figure 2 shows that the current account position of the periphery economies 
closed by 2015–2016 or in certain cases changed to a surplus. The substantial 
volume of assets held by Germany and the Netherlands remained unchanged in 
the meantime; moreover, Germany’s assets have even increased since 2010. This 
pattern only partially corresponds to what we expect when market adjustment 
works properly. As a reminder: if the downturn in one specific region is stronger 
than in the others, the adjustment mechanisms will cause the export of the weaker 
performing economy to become relatively more competitive within the euro area. 
This represents a shift towards financing capacity and, on macro level, it helps 
deleveraging. But the process corresponding to this also creates the reflection: 
once competitiveness shifts within the area, the other economies must show 
a decreasing balance all other things being equal (ceteris paribus). The “ceteris 
paribus” condition is essential because economic relations outside of the currency 
union may possibly influence the overall balance in another direction. But this is 
rather just a dummy obstacle in the perception of change directions. If the products 
of the originally recessive economy become more competitive than those of euro 
area members, this is reflected not only in the internal, but also concurrently in 
the external connections. For this very reason, the contents shown in Figure 2 do 
not convince us that the EMU could rely on unimpaired adjustment mechanisms. In 
addition, the closing of the current position at the periphery does not cause debt to 
contract materially, not even at a macro level for the time being. The balance sheets 
of the banks of peripheral countries, and lately especially those of Italian banks, 
continue to show outstandingly high volumes of non-performing loans (Laurent 
2017). It seems likely that the mostly 5–15 per cent current account deficits until 
2010 “melted away” not because of income generating export expansions, but 
due to the forced and rapid decrease of imports. We receive differing data about 
the economic performance of the members, which may once again face the single 
monetary policy with dilemma after the symmetrical position stemming from the 
contagion of the crisis (see Eichengreen 2009).
This article tests the observation suggesting the weakness of the adjustment based 
on several aspects, taking the OCA criteria as basis. The objective is not to discuss 
the conditions one by one in detail, but to identify the correlations among them so 
that we can obtain a picture of the resistance to the endogenous spiral.
3.1. Flexibility of prices and wages
Based on the analysis of the European Commission (Dhyne et al. 2009), the price 
level of the euro area was overall rather inflexible before the crisis. The authors 
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examined the frequency of consumer price changes in comparison with the USA.13 
According to the results, consumer prices changed on average annually in the EMU. 
In 2009, the share of monthly price changes was 15 per cent in the euro area, 
while in the USA, the same was materially higher: 25 per cent. Consumer mark-
downs were more frequent in the United States, while in the EMU the retail sector 
introduced significant inflexibility into price levels by comparison with producer 
prices. Dhyne et al. (2009) revealed more significant differences in the behaviour of 
prices among various product categories than among the Member States. Based on 
this, the relative inelasticity of the price level characterised members more or less 
to the same extent, with a symmetrical pattern among product categories. Services 
always showed negligible repricing frequency, while the prices of unprocessed food 
were the most volatile, apart from energy prices. As part of services, the share of 
monthly price changes in 2009 was only 5.6 per cent, but that of unprocessed food 
was 28.3 per cent. In the same year, services represented 47.5 per cent of the euro 
area’s consumption expenditure based on Eurostat data.14 Thus, the prices of goods 
consumed at the highest rate proved to be the most inflexible.
According to the survey, changes included the same proportion of downward 
price drifts and price increases. This bears significance because in the appropriate 
reflection adjustment both directions may become necessary. The same must be 
examined for wages. Prior to the crisis, notable asymmetrical wage developments 
happened in the euro area. In the periphery countries, the period of growth 
financed from loans coincided with a significant wage increase period. The growth 
rate of nominal wages exceeded productivity, while in Germany wages increased 
to a lesser extent than productivity (Schmidt – Weigert 2013; Hankel et al. 2010). 
In other words, wages proved to be flexible in the periphery countries, while less 
so in the centre (although wage growth could have been considered, which has 
fewer obstacles in principle compared to the reverse direction). 
Figure 3 shows wage dynamics, while Figure 4 illustrates the developments in 
consumer price levels after April 2010 in the periphery countries and in the central 
countries. It can be concluded from the Figures that since 2010, Greece, Spain, 
Portugal and partly Ireland performed an overall substantial internal devaluation. 
The gross average wage was decreasing at least temporarily in each of the periphery 
states until 2015. A sustained, large-scale contraction only occurred in Greece,
13  Comparison with the United States, a currency union also wide-spread and heterogeneous from many 
aspects, is rather obvious. We have already discussed in the foregoing the differences in terms of schemes 
and institutions to be considered when making the comparison. In the sections below, the comparison will 
be performed based on some real economics and market adjustment aspects. 
14  I performed the calculation based on the database of Eurostat titled “Final consumption expenditure of 
households by consumption purpose”, http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=nama_
co3_c&lang=en. Downloaded: 22 February 2017.
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where the gross average wage decreased by an average 3.16 per cent per year 
between 2009 and 2015, while the maximum annual decrease exceeded even 7 
per cent. However, in the public sphere, every concerned state performed wage 
cuts, and in addition, the amount of pensions and various budgetary benefits also 
shrank (see i.e. Krugman 2011; Skouras 2013; León – Pavolini – Guillén 2015).
In the economies of the central countries, such as the Netherlands and Germany, we 
observed a change of a more moderate pace compared to the periphery countries 
since the outbreak of the crisis. Between 2009 and 2015, gross average wage 
increased by an average of 2.5 per cent per year in Germany and by 1.7 per cent 
in the Netherlands. This may partly indicate a less flexible wage level, since both 
economies had some expansion periods during the given period (see Figure 9). We 
observed wage adjustment in the data of the last two years for Germany entailed 
by economic growth.
Similarly, the change of price level primarily affected the periphery countries. 
According to Figure 4, prices decreased for an extended period in Greece, Spain 
and, to a lesser extent, in Ireland, Portugal and Italy. In the meantime, price levels 
evolved in a relatively stable manner in Germany and the Netherlands. The GDP 
growth of the past 2 to 3 years in excess of the euro area average started to bring 
Figure 3
Developments in gross average wage in the central and periphery countries, 2001–
2015, YoY, change expressed as a percentage
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about a more substantial price increase in these economies from the second half 
of 2016. Meanwhile, the period of internal devaluation seems to be ending in the 
periphery countries: in the last months of 2016, price levels increased and the 
average wage remained at the same level also in Greece, Spain and Italy.
We can have only one conclusion and especially one question based on the 
foregoing. The conclusion is that internal price and wage adjustments unavoidable in 
single currency areas in the lack of other means are also achieved to a certain extent 
in the EMU. In the light of the preceding imbalances (excessive indebtedness), it 
is not surprising that in the periphery countries purchasing power, and in turn, 
prices and wages also declined due to diminishing borrowing opportunities and 
the burdens associated with balance adjustment. But the adjustment process is 
rather unilateral; the expenditures of central countries could not really support 
its efficiency because wages and prices in these countries shifted relatively to 
a lesser extent (they increased less). It is difficult to draw a stronger conclusion 
for the resilience of price and wage levels, because as a result of debtor-creditor 
inter-linkages the crisis also spilled over to the central countries; therefore, it is 
not possible to examine the proper reflection adjustment (positive and negative 
branch). The upcoming period may be decisive in terms of whether prices and wages 
will evolve in a flexible way in Germany and the Netherlands, two countries about 
Figure 4
Monthly average change of consumer prices in 2010 in the central countries and in 
the periphery countries
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to enter economic recovery, enabling the complete unravelling of the effect of the 
southern internal devaluation. But here the question comes up: can the internal 
devaluation of the periphery countries be really effective in the EMU? We can give 
a definite answer based on the following OCA criteria.
3.2. Product market integration
Because price and wage adjustment can only work properly in a closely integrated 
internal market and alongside the mutual competitiveness of products, we must 
examine the likelihood of lower prices resulting in substantial export performance 
for the periphery countries that are making the adjustment sacrifice. We can directly 
ask the question as to what results did the internal devaluation discussed in the 
foregoing have so far.
Starting from the period prior to 2010, we can conclude that the euro area is overall 
an integrated product market region in which trade among members has a long-
standing history. The internal trade in goods and services amounted to 50 per cent 
of the total annual export of the €16 group on average between 1998 and 2008.15 
Thus, members were just as open towards one another as towards the rest of the 
world (from the perspective of export). Figure 5 shows that trade was continuously 
increasing among the €19 economies starting from the early 2000’s.
However, there are material differences in the significance of trade in the euro area: 
some members were relatively more isolated. The value of external trade in the area 
as a percentage of GDP even in the case of Portugal, Spain, Italy and France was 
approximately 15 per cent lower than the German value, and was markedly below 
the values of the Benelux states and Austria in terms of the 1999–2011 average (ECB 
2013). Moreover, a shift in emphasis took place towards “non-tradable” goods in the 
Mediterranean countries (Schmidt – Weigert 2013), as we have already discussed 
in connection with the housing loan boom (henceforth see Part 3.3).
Based on the experiences so far, the crisis seems to weaken the tightness of internal 
trade relations. According to Figure 5, the level of trade among members stagnated 
between 2010 and 2015 while the euro area started to rapidly expand its external 
exports. Even according to the latest data, extra-EMU exports are expanding: in 
2016, they exceeded the level of 2010 by 18 per cent. By comparison: exports 
between members was 5.6 per cent higher at the same point in time. The level of 
internal exports showed a minor increase for the first time in 2015. This does not 
corroborate that the price and wage cuts in the periphery countries would have 
generated internal export surplus (improvement in competitiveness).
15  Not including the three Baltic EMU Member States, calculated based on the data of Hankel et al. (2010).
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Figure 6 and the data series of the members’ exports outside the monetary union is 
very telling. Figure 6 illustrates the changes in the partner composition of German 
imports. Since 1998, periphery countries have been selling products and services 
to Germany in an unchanged proportion. For Italy and Ireland, a continuous slow 
contraction can be observed. Meanwhile, even economies that are not part of the 
currency area were able to increase their share on the German import market; 
thus, we cannot explain their advantage with the elimination of transaction costs 
and exchange rate risk. Certain Central and Eastern European states obtained an 
increasing share and China became a key import partner.
Because periphery states were unable to increase their share of exports to the 
largest economy of the euro area, despite the recent price reductions, the prospect 
of the expected competitiveness adjustment seems limited. According to the 
international trade database of Eurostat, the increase in the global exports of the 
Figure 5
Changes in trade conducted by euro area Member States with internal and external 
partners. Export and import volume indices, 2010 = 100 per cent.
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€19 countries cannot be linked to the Mediterranean countries, either. The 2010 
level of exports to outside the EMU could not be reached by Spain and Portugal 
until 2014, by Greece until 2015 and by Italy until the end of 2016.16 Of the Member 
States in the epicentre of the euro crisis only Ireland and most recently Spain and 
Portugal contributed in merit to the increase in external export. World market 
exports show a rather diverging pattern in the zone for the time being, underpinning 
the assumption that the crisis might have impaired the integrity of the product 
market in the zone.17 Based on the data, the current account balance of periphery 
countries was essentially driven by the drop in imports and not by the increase 
in exports. If no change happens in that respect, we should expect a delay in the 
shedding of outstanding debt.18
16  Calculated based on Eurostat International Trade Database, “Euro area 19 international trade – monthly data 
(ei_etea19_m)” (export volume indices, 2010 = 100 per cent, seasonally and work day effect adjusted data). 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=ei_etea19_m&lang=en Downloaded: 18 March 2017.
17  Together with Germany, the Netherlands, Slovakia and Slovenia also boast of fast external export expansion 
compared to 2010. 
18  As set out above, based on its current position, Spain seems to be an exception, where the data already 
indicate substantial external export growth. But shedding liabilities is obviously not a simple task even 
when coupled with growing financing capacity, because – as discussed in Part 1 – the export revenues of 
the various economic players are not directly available for the deleveraging of other players.
Figure 6
Changes in the composition of German imports by trading counterparties. Share of 
counterparties, %, 1998–2015.
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3.3. Similarities and diversification of economic structures
EMU economies can be essentially considered diversified, none of the members 
are characterised by an extreme exposure to partial shocks. This is suggested by the 
fact that trade within the zone is mainly conducted between industries, which was 
also facilitated by the rise in internal trade prior to the crisis, because most of the 
members were expanding the scope of their export goods at that time (ECB 2013).
However, some previously present differences preserved during the crisis can 
also be observed. These differences may cause problems in the operation of 
the adjustment mechanisms, and as such, in the degree of price elasticity and 
export competitiveness and also in labour mobility. In Germany, manufacturing 
has a relatively higher share than services, and according to the data publications 
of the Eurostat, its share within added value remained stable despite the decline 
in global demand. Between 2008 and 2013, this share exceeded the internal 
contribution of manufacturing in Mediterranean economies by 13 percentage points 
in each of these years. At the same time, in Greece, Portugal and Spain, trade, 
construction industry and services, that is, practically non-tradable goods were 
relatively dominant. Compared to the structural stability of the German economy, 
we can observe a more significant structural realignment between 2008 and 2013 
in these countries, because, for example, the bursting of the real estate bubble in 
Spain setback the share of the construction industry’s added value by 10 percentage 
points. But a radical structural change or a shift towards manufacturing failed to 
take place. So the most relevant structural differences are manifested in that central 
countries primarily operate a knowledge and capital intensive economy, while the 
southern periphery countries’ economies are more labour intensive. 
In terms of market adjustment, several possible obstacles can be identified here. On 
the one hand, as discussed in the foregoing, prices of the service sector are usually 
less flexible. During the 2010 crisis, this disadvantage was only partially present, 
because compared to other factors, the price adjustment of periphery countries 
was not negligible. On the other hand, it is also true for service sectors even in 
modern economies that the value generated by these sectors does not lend itself 
as much to export. These sectoral proportions may have played the role in that 
periphery countries were unable to increase their exports despite the price level 
reduction. Although the role of tourism-related export revenues is outstanding 
in these economies – as demonstrated by the third quarter surpluses shown in 
the quarterly current accounts statistics –, these are not necessarily sufficient to 
create a real effect for internal devaluation. At the same time, Germany’s extensive 
manufacturer capacities are immanently prone to generate sustained surplus, which 
is due, inter alia, to the economic interest linked to uninterrupted production (see 
EC 2016). The different focus is also apparent in the labour force base of the two 
zones, so mobility is hindered by the differences in qualification and skills. Even 
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with adequate migration willingness, it remains uncertain whether a manufacturing 
entity on an upswing needs the same amount of additional labour as the number 
of workers left unemployed in an economy sinking into recession (or vice versa).
3.4. Labour mobility
Labour mobility can be efficiently captured through the analysis of the distribution 
of unemployment rates, since any sustained difference suggests that the shocks 
affecting the regions cannot disappear through the flow of labour force (see for 
example Eichengreen et al. 1990). Figure 7 shows developments in the deviation 
of unemployment rates between 2001–2016 for the €12 and €19 country groups 
and, by comparison, for the states of the USA.
In the euro area, the unemployment rates of the Member States had been already 
significantly different for a sustained period before the crisis compared to the USA. 
This difference was gradually decreasing until 2008, but primarily within the broader 
group containing 19 countries, where the contraction on the deviation is mainly 
Figure 7
Deviation of unemployment rates in the euro area and the USA, 2001–2016
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attributable to the rapid decline in unemployment in the three Baltic states. The 
difference between the €12 countries started from a lower level, but dropped less 
steeply until 2008, i.e. the average value remained relatively more stable in this 
narrower circle.
It is worthy of attention that the global crisis originating from the USA brought 
about only a slight divergence in the state-level unemployment data in the United 
States of America itself and any substantial increase in deviation was only observed 
for a period of two years. Thereafter, the increased deviation disappeared over 
a period of 5 years: In 2015–2016, a stable 1 percentage point average divergence, 
already seen prior to the crisis, can be observed. By contrast, from 2008 and from 
the time the crises reached the euro area, these rates suddenly started to drift 
apart. Divergence increased all the way until 2013. Over the past three years, these 
differences decreased by approximately 0.5 percentage points each year, but the 
€19 block is still approximately 3 percentage points away from the starting value. 
The divergence was stronger within the €12 group compared with the group of the 
19 member states. This phenomenon is in line with the above finding, according to 
which unemployment rates of the 12 countries were converging at a slower pace. 
This highlights the source of tension between the central and periphery countries 
since Greece, Spain, Italy, Ireland and Portugal, considered to be the centre of the 
crisis, are all part of the €12 group, together with Germany.
The decline in deviation over the past three years suggests a certain mobilisation 
of the labour force. The labour force statistics published by the Member States 
are unfortunately too narrow to form a dynamic picture of the distribution 
of migrant workers by place of birth. In the meantime, the issue of the labour 
shortage experienced in the German economy arises from time to time (Eichhorst 
et al. 2013; BMWFW 2013; EP 2015). This phenomenon is hardly consistent with 
the high unemployment rates of the periphery countries, especially with the 
outstandingly high youth unemployment analysed on a number of occasions, that 
is, it definitely implies some mobility issues. The young employee group must be 
highlighted because a greater geographic and occupational mobility is expected 
from them. Klekowski von Koppenfels – Höhne (2017) give accounts of the increasing 
employment in Germany of workers coming from Southern Europe, especially the 
young and skilled ones. This correlates with the MobilPro EU programme launched 
by the German government in 2013 which intended to connect the needs of young 
unemployed workers of Southern Europe with the need of the German economy for 
skilled workers. But according to the authors, the share of employment in Germany 
of Southern European workers cannot be accurately determined.
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Figure 8 illustrates developments in youth unemployment rates in the €12 countries 
and in the United States. The European data were available for the age group 
between 20 to 24 years while the US data were available for the age group between 
25 to 34 years, measuring the share of unemployed persons against the active 
population of the appropriate age in both cases. The EMU values are shown by 
Member State, while for US states, the value of minimum and maximum rates is 
shown for each year. Based on this, we can compare the range of deviation and the 
dynamics occurred during the crisis. Our findings here are similar to those made 
for Figure 7. In the United States, we observe a smaller difference between the 
minimum and the maximum rates prior to the crisis, which is approximately 4–5 
percentage points. This is one third of the 15 percentage points difference observed 
Figure 8
Developments in youth unemployment rates in the €12 countries and in the states 
of the USA
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in the €12. (It is interesting to note that regional differences are systematically 
higher in the unemployment data of the young age groups compared to the figures 
available for the total active population both in the USA and in the EU.) As a result 
of the crisis, we can observe a minor, short divergence in the United States while in 
the €12 block, deviation remained substantial even after 2008–2010. 2013 seems 
to be a turning point in that case as well. The range started to narrow since then, 
although it still remains expressly broad: it is over 30 percentage points. The same 
countries keep the minimum and maximum values with some slight changes since 
the start of the time series: the lowest rates are associated with the Netherlands, 
Germany and Austria (central countries) while the highest rates can be linked to 
Greece and Spain (periphery countries). This constancy suggests that there are some 
inherent problems also in terms of labour force mobility in this group of countries. 
But based on recent developments and government measures taken during the 
past few years, change is not impossible in the case of skilled employees. However, 
expectations regarding qualifications and expertise call attention to the fact that 
differences in the economic structure discussed in Part 3.3 represent a real obstacle 
and there are also some language and language knowledge related issues.
3.5. Business cycles
We have already talked about the diverging economic performance of EMU Member 
States. As a closure of the analysis, Figure 9 shows the developments in GDP 
between 2007 and 2016. This picture shows relatively similar patterns of booms 
and busts for the Member States which is the consequence of a general product 
market integrity and relative structural similarity in the real economy, while from the 
monetary aspect, it is the consequence of a close interlocking of financial markets. 
Thus, the members move more or less together in their directions, but the delays 
compared to one another and the differences in scale may face the monetary policy 
with some constant optimisation issues. De Grauwe (2012a:175) illustrates this 
with the example of the 2008 downturn: according to his estimation, at that point 
in time the zone as a whole did not differ from the potential output, “so there was 
nothing to adjust”. However, as we can see in the Figure, the current annual growth 
of specific countries varied in a range of 4 percentage points, producing both decline 
and growth in GDP, therefore the difference was substantial between the individual 
output gaps. Individual members certainly had different monetary policy needs.
At present, a situation is emerging where the economies may demonstrate 
heterogeneous growth over the medium term, and as a result, inflationary 
outcomes may also substantially differ. The most recent data as of the end of 2016 
currently signal the end of the deflationary period, but the risk of inflation is uneven 
throughout the zone. From the perspective of the members showing more fragile 
economic performance and leaving deflation behind, the professional opinion 
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regarding the necessity of an interest rate increase may be completely different than 
in the case of those members that have a considerably more favourable outlook for 
economic activity. In that regard, the world market connections presented in Part 
3.2 play a special role, because the economies that are (also) externally oriented 
may pick up momentum more easily from the expected growth of external partners 
(see IMF 2017).
4. Summary of conclusions
This article examined the endogenous disturbances of the single currency area and 
the background of the euro crisis as well as the prospects of market adjustment. 
Currency zones always carry the risk that the common (single) monetary policy is 
unable to meet the simultaneous needs of the regions. In that case, endogenous 
feedbacks are generated in the system that may entail inflationary, financial 
stability and real economy related problems. This mechanism played a role in 
the developments in the euro crisis because after the introduction of the single 
currency, interest rates evened out at a low level, which encouraged debt overhang 
Figure 9
Developments in real GDP growth rate in countries of the euro area from 2007
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and asset price bubbles in the periphery countries. Deepening financial integration 
was accompanied by the “efficient” dissemination of vulnerabilities as these were 
increasingly shifted inward, creating unsustainable exposures for both the central 
and the periphery countries (both in gross and net terms). EMU’s institutional 
system was unprepared for the early identification of private indebtedness and 
the mitigation of systemic risks and was also partly unprepared for the management 
of public debt. The lack of clarity of the crisis management and risk community 
framework resulted in a confidence crisis in the markets at the most critical 
moments.
But when we are missing risk monitoring, economic policy coordination and crisis 
management systems, we must also ask the question as to what fundamentally 
drives economic disturbances and/or what may prevent their self-adjustment. This is 
relevant irrespective of the degree to which we consider market efficiency as being 
valid, because there is no guarantee for the absolute power of institutions. Even 
a properly operating institutional system is not supposed to handle repeated severe 
tensions. From the perspective of real economy, EMU shows a mixed picture based 
on the experiences gained so far. Generally speaking, a region having an integrated 
product market and exhibiting interconnectivity in many areas has a rational need 
for a common currency. However, the centre-periphery fault-line may force the 
members over the medium term to draw the balance of belonging to the euro 
area. After the 2010 crisis, the relative internal price and wage adjustments entailed 
economic sacrifices for the periphery countries, but based on the foregoing, it 
proved to be less efficient as it failed to meet its essential objective to date, i.e., 
the expansion of exports. This can be explained by complex competitiveness issues. 
Moreover, no fast labour market adjustment took place either. The partial results 
primarily affect employees with a higher qualification, but youth unemployment 
remains overall an acute problem. To achieve the long-term functioning of the euro, 
and what is more, to actually realise the desired benefits, a comprehensive, targeted 
structural, competitiveness and regional policy framework and the harmonisation 
of initiatives are needed, which can ensure the improvement of internal adjustment 
mechanisms within the area.
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